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Globalization and Ethics
It has been a long time since globalization first pro-
voked violent changes in the diverse fields of politics, 
economy, society, and culture. This stream, principally 
derived from economic globalization (the expansion 
of a capitalist economy and the formation of a global 
market), has brought about a huge increase in the 
cross-border flows of peoples, goods, materials, and 
information by lowering many of the barriers between 
nations. Needless to say, we should not overlook in 
this context the role of the worldwide information net-
work (that is, information and media globalization).
From a philosophical viewpoint, this sort of glo-
balization in the market, transportation, information, 
etc., consists in a departure from the material, the 
physical, and the natural, such as land, ground, soil, 
territory, region, country, history, community, 
restricted society, traditional culture, race, blood, ori-
gin, etc. There is, thus, “deindustrialization” (a drift to 
post-secondary industry) and a structural shift to ter-
tiary industries (the service industry) and the 
information industry in economically advanced coun-
tries, and at the same time, an “international division 
of labor” that imposes primary and secondary indus-
tries on “developing countries.” In this new global 
regime, the relocation of material production to the 
“Third World” gives rise in advanced countries to the 
illusion of emancipation from material constraints, an 
illusion confirmed by advanced information technolo-
gies and the “media” (the media technology or media 
industry) that pervades our everyday life.
It goes without saying that this globalization 
necessitates a great change (“Reform,” “Renovation”)
in political, economic, legal, and cultural systems, but 
this necessity also extends to the fields of philosophy 
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Abstract
This article approaches the notion of developing an ethics for the age of globalization. Developing such an 
ethics necessitates revisiting the premises of traditional ethics, which include three presuppositions: (1) Pre-
sentism, (2) Anthropocentrism, and (3) Individualism (voluntarism). The ethical subject is restricted to the agents 
and themes that appear in the present time and space, leading to the position of human being as a privileged actor 
in ethics as well as to Individualism (voluntarism). These traditional ethical paradigms were established at an 
epoch when the power of technology was relatively small, and in today’s globalized world, these paradigms must 
be redefined. We need to extend the range of ethics according to the extension of the politico-market system and 
technology, taking into account all absent agents and factors. This new approach requires the expansion of the 
three ethical presuppositions: (1) from Presentism to Futurism, (2) from the restrictive consideration for humanity 
to a general consideration for all lives or all beings, and (3) from the individual subject to a collective subject in 
terms of responsibility. Above all, it is imperative to take into consideration the temporal dimension, the future 
generations of the world that are not yet present, and those generations that may even never be present. Such an 
ethics, which calculates the incalculable, has to leave open the possibility of becoming for the world, in the world, 
and the very possibility of the world. True “globalization” consists of such a “worldization,” that is, the move-
ment, formation, or becoming of the world to come. In order to allow this “wordlization” to fit into our ethical 
framework, we must also expand the concept of “globalization,” redefining it as not simply a political, economic 
movement but a movement of “englobing” all beings and all lives, including future generations. Such an ethical 
globalization will be a globalization of hope.
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and thought. In particular, ethics needs to be reconsid-
ered entirely in what is a genuinely convulsive 
situation that overturns the traditional ways of think-
ing and value systems. Ethics has a mission to think 
about such issues as good and evil and how to lead a 
good life in order to point us in the right direction. It is 
urgent that we reconstruct ethics, unless we want to 
throw it away as obsolete and ineffectual. However, 
all of the traditional and established ethical systems in 
human history have presuppositions that are absolutely 
incapable of coping with the new circumstances pre-
sented by globalization. This premise is what we could 
call Presentism. Without “deconstructing” this Pre-
sentism, there will be no possibility of reconstructing 
an ethics for the future.
Presentism
What does it mean to say that previous ethics 
have been molded out of Presentism? We refer here to 
a text of Hans Jonas. In his work The Imperative of 
Responsibility, he points out that traditional ethics has 
been based on “simultaneousness,” “directness,” and 
“reciprocality.” In traditional ethics, “the range of 
human action and therefore responsibility was nar-
rowly circumscribed.”⑴
All enjoinders and maxims of traditional ethics, 
materially different as they may be, show this 
confinement to the immediate setting of the 
action. “Love thy neighbor as thyself”; “Do unto 
others as you would wish them to do unto you”;
“Instruct your child in the way of truth”; “Strive
for excellence by developing and actualizing the 
best potentialities of your being qua man”; “Sub-
ordinate your individual good to the common 
good”; “Never treat your fellow man as a means 
only but always also as an end in himself”̶and
so on. Note that in all these maxims the agent and 
the “other” of his action are sharers of a common 
present. It is those who are alive now and in some 
relationship with me who have a claim on my 
conduct as it affects them by deed or omission. 
The ethical universe is composed of contempo-
raries, and its horizon to the future is confined by 
the foreseeable span of their lives. Similarly con-
fined is its horizon of place, within which the 
agent and the other meet as neighbor, friend, or 
foe, as superior and subordinate, weaker and 
stronger, and in all the other roles in which 
humans interact with one another. To this proxi-
mate range of action all morality was geared.⑵
It means that previous ethics have been focused 
only on presence in the spatio-temporal sense of the 
word. Traditional ethics is restricted to subjects as well 
as objects in the range of presence, modeled after a 
face-to-face and contemporary relationship: this is an 
ethics for and among present beings who exist in the 
here and now, whether this being is subject or object. 
In short, this is an ethics of what is countable, an eth-
ics of countability. Of course, it is natural that we 
should look after or respect those beings who are pres-
ent before us as ethical subjects, or within the reach of 
our actions and influences. This is an important ethical 
truth as valid today as ever. However, the conditions 
of globalization, with its advanced technologies, 
demolish this premise of the ethics of presence. The 
global market and its transport and information net-
works reduce distances, removing peoples and 
products from their native places and origins in order 
to circulate goods, materials, resources, knowledge, 
ideas, and information. Hence the juxtaposition and 
mixture of foreign objects/subjects. In a world that is 
connected by highly developed transport and informa-
tion systems, all heterogeneous, distant, absent beings 
have the potential to become neighbors, a part of the 
“global village” constructed by this ubiquitous net-
work. Thus, it becomes possible for one individual’s
small actions to have a significant effect for someone 
else living on the other side of the globe. This has 
environmental consequences, for it also means that 
industrial activities can have a tremendous effect far 
beyond their immediate location.
The generation of electricity by nuclear power is 
an obvious example. If a severe nuclear accident, like 
those of Chernobyl and Fukushima, occurs in China, it 
will cause widespread damage to neighboring coun-
tries, particularly those to the east, including Japan 
and Korea. What is more, it will have serious after-
effects on the environment for generations to come. 
Even if there is no accident, a nuclear power plant 
cannot generate energy without radioactive waste, 
which means future generations pay for our prosperity. 
Nuclear energy policy thus confronts us with an ethi-
cal question beyond our immediate time and space̶
does the present generation have the right to live in 
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prosperity at the cost of others to come, who are 
absent here and now? J.-P. Sartre said that the advent 
of nuclear weapons made humanity into an entity that 
shared a common destiny. In order to face the problem 
of nuclear power, we are required to expand the con-
cept of ethics and responsibility to an extent that 
previous ethical systems did not have to consider: an 
ethics of responsibility for our species, humanity, and 
for the entire environment, for the world itself.
Presentism, Anthropocentrism, 
Individualism
Here, let us point out three principal features of 
traditional ethics. We can refer to them as Presentism, 
Anthropocentrism, and Individualism (or volun-
tarism). We have explained the first of these already. It 
must have been impossible for past ethical systems to 
imagine that one might have a responsibility for 
human beings living a thousand years later. Anthropo-
centrism can be described as the restriction of ethics 
and responsibility to human subjects and objects. As 
Jonas says, “ethics accordingly was of the here and 
now, of occasions as they arise between men, of the 
recurrent, typical situations of private and public 
life.”⑶ In a sense, it is reasonable or common sense to 
restrict ethical beings to humans. It seems nonsensical 
to accuse anyone of using violence when they punch a 
stone. What about animals, though? If one beats a dog 
or cat, a whale or dolphin, it probably can be regarded 
as “violence” or animal abuse, but it may be difficult 
to use terms like “abuse,” “ill-treatment,” and “murder”
when describing the killing of a mosquito or a cock-
roach. This shows that the ethical criterion for judging 
what agents have to be respected consists in “proxim-
ity” (that is to say, degree of presence) to humankind.
Individual voluntarism refers to the idea that the 
traditional ethical agent was based on the individual 
and its will. Jonas writes as follows in his criticism of 
Kant’s categorical imperative:
Kant’s categorical imperative was addressed to 
the individual, and its criterion was instantaneous. 
It enjoined each of us to consider what would 
happen if the maxim of my present action were 
made, or at this moment already were, the princi-
ple of a universal legislation; the self-consistency 
or inconsistency of such a hypothetical universal-
ization is made the test for my private choice.⑷
Upon reconsidering the matter, it is this restric-
tion of ethical agents to individuals and their wills that 
made it possible to ignore ethical responsibility for 
acts of violence or outrages in wartime committed in 
the name of the state or some other group. It was only 
in recent times that crimes against humanity during 
wartime began to be denounced or judged in the court-
room.
What was the cause of this limitation to the clas-
sic concept of ethics? According to Jonas, when the 
conventional concept of ethics was developed, the 
power of human action was not so great that it could 
destroy the world. When the force of scientific tech-
nology exceeds the scale imagined by previous ethics, 
we have no choice but to widen the scope of responsi-
bility as new conditions might require. The measure of 
responsibility must correspond with that of power.
It will be the burden of the present argument to 
show that these premises no longer hold, and to 
reflect on the meaning of this fact for our moral 
condition. More specifically, it will be my conten-
tion that with certain developments of our powers 
the nature of human action has changed, and, 
since ethics is concerned with action, it should 
follow that the changed nature of human action 
calls for a change in ethics as well: this not 
merely in the sense that new objects of action 
have added to the case material on which received 
rules of conduct are to be applied, but in the more 
radical sense that the qualitatively novel nature of 
certain of our actions has opened up a whole new 
dimension of ethical relevance for which there is 
no precedent in the standards and canons of tradi-
tional ethics. The novel powers I have in mind 
are, of course, those of modern technology.⑸
In his Imperative of Responsibility, Jonas accuses 
Francis Bacon and his famous phrase “scientia est 
potentia” of being the source of a human arrogance 
that provoked the wholesale exploitation of the planet 
by technology for the purpose of expanding human 
health, wealth, and individual or social possibilities. 
Bacon himself, however, was not so naïve as to affirm 
such a human mastery, which justified treating and 
transforming nature as required or desired. Or rather, 
such a notion was beyond the reach of his imagination 
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because, for him, humans could only act under condi-
tions of obedience to the laws of nature in order to 
have any practical effect on the external world. 
Bacon’s understanding rested on the premise that it 
was impossible to manage, rule, and govern nature by 
force or to act contrary to nature. We might posit the 
image of an absolute, unwavering terra, a Great 
Mother who generously embraces her little demon of 
a child, no matter what he does with technology, 
behind which might be an overmastering confidence 
in the Creation and Acts of God. At least, the power of 
technology was not so big that it could destroy the 
world. “All this has decisively changed. Modern tech-
nology has introduced actions of such novel scale, 
objects, and consequences that the framework of for-
mer ethics can no longer contain them.”⑹
New concepts of “Globalization” 
and “Ethics”
From now on, we must change or extend the con-
cept of globalization. Globalization does not mean 
only the economic and political movement of expan-
sion all over the world, but also the technological 
movement that tends to encompass all beings, all lives, 
all generations, and all species. We must now call this 
all-inclusive movement or tendency “globalization.”
Above all, we need to recognize and emphasize its 
diachronic dimension in relation to its synchronic 
dimension. Globalization should not be reduced to a 
simple geographical concept of the world. More 
exactly, the planet’s existence has to be considered or 
reflected as a continuum or a node, an extension from 
the past into the future, that is to say, a process of eter-
nal becoming. Living in and reflecting on the present 
world cannot be done properly without this diachronic 
dimension of the world, without, so to speak, this 
“worldization” (this becoming of the world, world 
generation, world formation), another aspect (pre-
cisely, the other aspect) of “globalization.” It reflects a 
certain “Genesis” without which we will lose our 
future generations and the significance or worth of our 
present world.
From this point of view, a new ethics will require 
following extensive turns:
1.  From Presentism to Futurism (consideration of 
the world to come)
2.  Form restrictive consideration for Humanity to 
general consideration for all lives or all beings
3.  From individual subject to collective subject in 
responsibility
When scientific technology encompassed nuclear 
energy (nuclear power generation, atomic bomb), 
humans possessed (or have been possessed by) a 
power huge enough to destroy the planet. What is at 
stake is the very existence of all beings, the dilemma 
of whether “to be or not to be,” in a very basic onto-
logical sense, an elementary, physical ontology far 
beyond a metaphysical ontology like Heidegger’s. 
Today, we find an ontological question directly related 
to physics as well as ethics, as in Spinoza’s philoso-
phy. We are on the verge of the ontological possibility 
of the world. What we are faced with is the possibility 
or rights of our future world, of future generations. 
Ultimately, this means the possibility itself of possibil-
ity, the generation of generation. Being is precisely the 
possibility of a world to come; in other words, the 
becoming of a world to come. We living humans in 
the present world must be responsible for the genera-
tion of our future generations, those who are not yet 
present. These generations do not exist in present 
space and time, nor can they make any response to our 
inquiry or call, much less have any right to do so. Of 
course, it is always possible that they will never ever 
come into being. What is threatened today, however, is 
the impossibility of their coming into being, the possi-
bility itself of impossibility. Thus, even impossibility 
is on the verge of extinction. It is our ethical duty to 
protect and hand over at least this possibility of impos-
sibility for generations to come. We are responsible 
for the beings who/which are incapable of responding. 
We are responsible for leaving open the possibility 
itself for future generations to respond to “us,” to other 
beings, to the world. Giving the responsibility (the 
possibility of response) to those beings yet to come, to 
the becoming (a present to the future, of the future, for 
the future) is a new ethics, an extended, generic ethics. 
This is a kind of present, a donation of what we cannot 
have, what is outside of our property (because this 
present is theirs, their possibility/responsibility, not 
ours). Once, the existence of the world “had been a 
first and unquestionable given, from which all idea of 
obligation in human conduct started out. Now it has 
itself become an object of obligation; the obligation 
namely to ensure the very premise of all obligation, 
that is, the foothold for a moral universe in the physi-
cal world̶the existence of mere candidates for a 
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moral order. This entails, among other things, the duty 
to preserve this physical world in such a state that the 
conditions for that presence remain intact; which in 
turn means protecting the world’s vulnerability from 
what could imperil those very conditions.”⑺
Destruction of the natural environment, the use of 
atomic energy and radioactive waste, gene manipula-
tion and its impact on our human descendants and the 
ecosystem: these phenomena and their consequences 
are difficult or principally impossible to know per-
fectly and predict because of the long time span, the 
gathering of data, the threshold of interpretation, etc. 
Now that the power and influence of technology might 
mean the total destruction of the world, however, this 
difficulty allow for no excuse any longer (“beyond
expectation”). It would be irresponsible to use diffi-
culty or impossibility as an excuse to refuse questions 
and arguments about what technology should be and 
how it should be used. On the basis of our understand-
ing, knowledge, and information, an ethics of 
technology must go further. Such work will be impos-
sible on the basis of scientific, technocratic, technicien
logic alone. It needs collective arguments and respon-
sible systems that are beyond specialties. We have to 
think “together” as a multiple, yet single being about 
what is desirable, what the world should be, and not 
only about what is made possible by technology.
Ethics for all beings
The second key point for a new ethics is the 
expansion of ethical objects from humans to all 
beings, all lives. Hans Jonas writes:
And what if the new kind of human action would 
mean that more than the interest of man alone is 
to be considered̶that our duty extends farther, 
and the anthropocentric confinement of former 
ethics no longer holds? It is at least not senseless 
anymore to ask whether the condition of extrahu-
man nature, the biosphere as a whole and in its 
parts, now subject to our power, has become a 
human trust and has something of a moral claim 
on us not only for our ulterior sake but for its own 
and in its own right. If this were the case it would 
require quite some rethinking in basic principles 
of ethics. It would mean to seek not only the 
human good but also the good of things extrahu-
man, that is, to extend the recognition of “ends in 
themselves” beyond the sphere of man and make 
the human good include the care for them.⑻
Jonas’s argument here seems to limit the object of 
ethics to the “biosphere,” but he affirms elsewhere the 
necessity of expanding ethical objects to all beings in 
the environment. It is certain that Jonas made great 
progress in extending ethics, but it is undeniable that 
he considers the human being to be a privileged, rep-
resentative ethical subject who bears full responsibility 
for all the beings because of the enormous technologi-
cal power humans possess. For this reason, there must 
be some concern that anthropocentrism lingers on in 
his work. He seems to be aware of this problem him-
self. He says
There is no need, however, to debate the relative 
claims of nature and man when it comes to the 
survival of either, for in this ultimate issue their 
causes converge from the human angle itself. 
Since, in fact, the two cannot be separated with-
out making a caricature of the human likeness̶
since, rather, in the matter of preservation or 
destruction the interest of man coincides, beyond 
all material needs, with that of life as his worldly 
home in the most sublime sense of the word̶we
can subsume both duties as one under the heading 
“responsibility toward man” without falling into a 
narrow anthropocentric view.⑼
We do not have the time to treat this delicate 
problem, here taking his words in the banal sense that 
those who possess more power are obliged to take 
more responsibility.
If there is something left to be desired in Jonas’s
argument, it is that we need to count among the new 
ethical object/subjects that are “extrahuman” such 
entities as robots, computers, cyborgs, and genetically 
modified humans, because from now on our environ-
ment will include the ubiquitous computing network, 
whether or not equipped with artificial intelligence, 
and robots, which (who) perform hard and dangerous 
tasks impossible to humans, will be the important 
members of human society. We have to regard as com-
panions of our world beings about whom or about 
which it would not make sense to ask whether they 
were natural or artificial, such as gene-manipulated 
humans. In such a situation, where should we draw the 
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boundary of ethics? Traditionally, ethics has regarded 
conscious beings as its objects, but if it is possible to 
think that there are “consciences” wherever there is 
the flow, exchange, and circulation of information, we 
have to treat them as participants in an ethical relation-
ship. Needless to say, we have to recognize the risk of 
going too far in extending the ethical concept: every-
thing would be an ethical object. We cannot, however, 
avoid a constant redefinition of being, life, conscience, 
etc., and without such a difficult problem, which in 
principle has no definitive answer, there would not be 
any fundamental ethics nor any sustainable society.
For the incalculable and the becoming 
of the world
The third and last feature of a new ethics is “Why
should we expand the concept of ethical actor from the 
individual to the collective?” Because the technology 
in question is beyond the reach of our individuality. 
This is a matter of system. Any technology implies, in 
its essence, some impersonal elements. As individuals, 
we cannot control today’s advanced technology, which 
becomes more and more expansive and complicated. 
It no longer consists simply of an individual, or one 
simple company, or one state, either in technological 
terms or in the mode of its production, diffusion, and 
use. That is why advanced technology cannot be placed 
under the control of a single agent. Because the mode 
of technology has been networked, so also must control, 
intervention, restructuring, and actors be networked. 
The heterogeneous, multiple actors must participate in a 
collective orientation of the technological ecosystem we 
live in. This collective multidimensional intervention 
will create our mode of being (presence) and our possi-
bility (future). Although perfect self-determination is 
nothing but an illusion, it would be suicidal to abandon 
ourselves to a perfect heteronomy or to simply be con-
formist. Neither option would constitute an ethics for 
the future, which seeks the best direction.
The collectivity that we call for will not be 
restricted to the human collectivity. It not only con-
tains things, animals, computers, and robots, but also 
beings to come, who (which) do not yet exist. More 
primordially, beings to come who (which) never exist; 
that is, the future itself, possibility itself. The ultimate 
actor in an ethics for the future is this power of being 
always open to the future.
Is such an ethics too heavy a task? An excessive 
task? Faced with rapid changes in our society, it is 
very hard or even impossible to foresee even just a 
few years ahead, to say nothing of the future in one 
hundred years’ time. Is it necessary to take responsi-
bility for what is not foreseeable? For what is not 
countable? For what is impossible? It is an abuse of 
ethics, isn’t it? This is not only the objection from util-
itarianism, rationalism, or conservatism, but also from 
the traditional ethics that condemned them. This is 
precisely the bind of Presentism. If we recognize the 
importance or necessity of ethics, we need to create an 
ethics that counts what is not countable. Because what 
an econocentric and technocentric type of globaliza-
tion tends to destroy is the being itself of the world 
and̶what is more̶the possibility itself of the being 
(or becoming) of the world. The existence of the world 
and its possibility are not things that are countable in 
their essence or in their “fact.” It is the “basis” of this 
uncountable existence of the world that lends possibil-
ity to all the countables̶politics, economy, law, 
society, culture, etc. From this point of view, an ethics 
that calculates the incalculable consists in an endeavor 
to make another calculation that makes possible all 
other calculations, beyond calculations. Without such 
a heterogeneous calculation, every technology or 
means, however sophisticated or advanced it may be, 
would be nothing but a makeshift.
We must not take the problem of globalization for 
only an economic or geopolitical one but extend it to 
another globalization; that of the ethics of being. That 
will be a true globalization. A globalization to come. A 
globalization of hope, hope for the future.
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